But the political prospects for a follow-up agreement are far less optimistic than the technical outlook – although not entirely bleak. One of the challenges, particularly within the United States, is the domestic policy of treaty ratification. A Republican president would probably have little trouble getting the two-thirds of the majority needed to get the advice and approval of the U.S. Senate. A Democratic president would face a much tougher challenge in the face of likely Republican opposition, but recent congressional support for the extension of New START indicates that there is some continued support from all parties for arms control. A well-conducted ratification campaign could benefit from this support, although such a campaign would undoubtedly be difficult. The Air Force also upgraded the Minuteman`s nuclear warheads by partially replacing the old W78 warheads with newer and more powerful W87 warheads, which were once used on the now-retired MX Peacekeeper ICBMs. The W87 entered U.S. stockpiles in 1986, making it one of the last warheads in the arsenal with the most modern safety features, including the insensitive construction of the highly explosive, fire-resistant mine, which can help minimize the possibility of plutonium dispersal in the event of an accident. As part of a 2004 LEP, the W87 warhead was renovated to extend its lifespan beyond 2025. The contract does not limit tactical systems,[15] such as the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, which will most likely replace the F-15E and F-16 in tactical nuclear delivery.

[16] The sharp decline in U.S.-Russian relations since New START came into force has increased the risks of both a quantitative arms race and a deep crisis or conflicts that could make nuclear use possible. As a result, the need for strategic arms control is greater than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020, passed with overwhelming support between parties, emphasizes that “legally binding and verifiable boundaries for Russia`s strategic nuclear forces are in the interest of U.S. national security.” 2 See below an update to existing nuclear stockpile improvement and delivery system modernization programs that make up each element of the U.S. Nuclear Triad: 1 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 21, 2018, 50-51 media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF; and Dmitry Solovov, “Russia says it must have nuclear parity with the United States,” Reuters, December 7, 2007, www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-nuclear/russia-says-it-must-have-nuclear-parity-with-u-s-idUSL0760845820071207. Long-range maritime take-off nuclear missiles (SLBGMs) could, if used, perform a military function similar to that of long-range ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Russia and the United States should therefore agree that long-range nuclear SLBGMs would be a new type of strategic offensive responsible for the treaty.

In order to facilitate inspection, they should also agree not to use these weapons on ships or submarines using non-nuclear maritime cruise missiles (SLCMs) or non-nuclear SLBGMs. Russia-China Nuclear Hotline In 1998, China established two state nuclear assistance lines, one with Russia and the other with the United States. However, concerns have been expressed about the target to be achieved in the next six months prior to the expiration of New START. Russia is unlikely to agree on limiting its non-strategic nuclear capabilities or the new systems it develops unless the United States discusses U.S. missile defense and non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.